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Anti-urbanism in Flanders: the political
and social consequences of a spatial
class struggle strategy
Les attitudes anti-urbaines en flandre: conséquences politiques et sociales d’une
strategie spatiale de lutte deS classes
Christian Kesteloot and Filip De Maesschalck
1 Measured by the active population in industry and the services sector, Flanders is one of
the most urbanised areas in the world – yet Flemings have no idea what a large town is.
To the 200,000 Flemish commuters who make the daily trek to work in Brussels, the city is
dirty, alien and dangerous. They only know the route from the office to the car park or to
the station and vice versa. Three thousand young people study at the EHSAL (an economic
high school) in Brussels, of whom barely 600 are in digs – not in Brussels, but chiefly in
Leuven or  Ghent.  To them,  the commuting time and associated costs  are more than
compensation for the idea that Brussels is big, unsafe and expensive. In a report to mark
the start of the academic year, a Kulak student in Kortrijk explained that it was a nice
place to study (“because everybody knows everybody”), much nicer than in the big city
where they would feel lost and would miss the safety and security. To them, the big city is
Leuven. In their minds, Brussels is probably a kind of hell.
2 The Flemish government1 showed discretion in choosing Brussels rather than Antwerp –
or, worse still, Mechelen – as the capital, but it comes down to no more than the presence
of  certain  institutions  and  a  certain  lip-service  to  the  Brussels  Flemings.  By  way  of
illustration,  the  Social  Impulse  Fund,  a  7  billion  Fund  of  the  Flemish  Community
distributed  to  the  municipalities  to  fight  social  exclusion  envisaged  a  few  hundred
millions for Brussels, compared to more than 2 billion for Antwerp and 1 billion for Ghent
2. Because of suburbanisation, the Flemings of Brussels are a dying breed. At a hearing in
the Flemish Parliament on the Flemish policy plan for Brussels, the big-wigs in some of
the leading Flemish cultural movements advocated calling a halt to the development of
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Brussels (in the first instance its international functions) and the protection of Brussels
Flemings  by  offering  them  pure  Flemish  institutions  in  all  areas  of  collective
consumption. The Vlaams Blok is also of this opinion and wishes to demote Brussels to a
kind of  protected area,  where poor francophone Brussels’  natives can also enjoy the
generous help of the Flemish people – on condition that they first undermine the Belgian
federal model by granting the Vlaams Blok a Flemish majority on the Brussels Capital
Council3. Not one hair on the heads of these Flemings believes that, as the international
charisma of Brussels increases, it represents more of an asset to Flemish emancipation
because its culture has a megaphone there,  which reaches much further than all  the
other Flemish cities put together and because culture can grow and blossom there much
more  intensively  as  a  result  of  interaction  with  a  cosmopolitan,  multicultural
environment.
3 Clearly,  an anti-urban attitude prevails  in Flanders,  which becomes more intense the
larger the town, reaching a peak in Brussels. Of course, community relations also play
their part in the Flemish aversion for Brussels. In the Belgian historical context, Brussels
has  proved to  be  a  powerful  French acculturation machine,  which also  extends  into
Flemish  Brabant  with  suburbanisation  (Sieben,  Witte  and  Dockx  in  Witte,  1993)4.
However, Brussels is very much the big city, where urban culture is alive, where the rest
of the world becomes accessible and tangible and, in particular, a place where wheeling
and  dealing  has  more  to  do  with  the  world  economy  than  with  local  and  regional
developments. To a minor extent, Antwerp is similar because of its port. In this respect,
Ghent is nothing more than a provincial capital.
4 In this paper, we explore the sources of this anti-urbanism, which are to be sought in the
geographical dimension of the class struggle in Belgium, and elaborate on the electoral
and socio-political consequences of it. In this second part of the paper we will dwell on
the geography of the last parliamentary elections and the reasons why, against all anti-
urban feelings, urban policies should be put higher on the Flemish political agenda.
 
Class struggle at the origins of anti-urbanism in
Flanders
5 The origins of this anti-urban attitude can be traced back to the geography of the 19th
century  industrial  revolution  and  its  social  consequences  (Saey  e.a.,  1998)5.  The
revolution  was  first  fully  developed  in  Wallonia,  where  it  gave  rise  to  the  Walloon
industrial  axis  related  to  coal  mining.  Although  the  geographical  outcome  of  the
industrialisation  process  was  more  regional  than  urban,  it  became  clear  how
industrialisation  and  the  spatial  concentration  of  workers  was  accompanied  by
secularisation and the growth of the socialist labour movement.
6 Industrialisation and urbanisation in Flanders came much later – at least if we leave aside
the textile industry, where home-working rather than large manufactures predominated
until well into the 19th century6. In the meantime, the bourgeoisie and the Church had
seen  the  danger  coming  and  new  resources  were  deployed  to  counteract  it.  At  the
political level, the papal encyclical letter Rerum Novarum (1891) was probably the most
important measure, since it opened the way to the Church for counteracting the socialist
labour movement with its own catholic labour organisations (Joye & Lewin, 1967; Gerard,
1998). This strategy is at the origin of the Belgian pillarisation or compartmentalisation of
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society into a Catholic and a Socialist  “pillar”.  Catholic workers are not only seen as
workers, but also as members of the Catholic community and incorporated in a series of
Catholic institutions and associations that can be mobilised each time the interests of the
Catholic pillar came under threat (the most successful mobilisation in Belgian history
concerned Catholic education). However, material life and mentality have been equally
shaped by the efforts of the Catholics to limit the spatial concentration of workers in the
large cities. Two types of interrelated measures were crucial in this respect: on the one
hand, the increase of the mobility of the workers, on the other hand the promotion of
home-ownership  outside  the  cities.  In  sharp  contrast  with  the  socialist  ideals,  the
Catholic strategies implied individual values to be ranked above collective values, the
family above the working class and the home above the city. 
7 In 1869,  cheap railway season tickets for workers were introduced.  Although railway
commuting  was  not  to  develop  significantly  until  the  end  of  the  19th  century,  this
measure was illustrative of class relationships at the time. Workers could earn higher
wages in the city than working the land, without losing it all in transport costs or more
expensive urban housing. Moreover, they could produce some vegetables and raise small
stock to complement their wage income. Their concentration in the poor, unhygienic and
politically dangerous 19th century city was counteracted7. But from the employers’ point
of view, the dispersal of the workers in the villages hindered their becoming aware of
common  workers’  interests  and  kept  them  under  control  of  the  Church  and  local
dignitaries.  Even more,  the  latter  continued to  profit  from rents  paid  for  land.  The
possibilities  offered  by  self-sufficiency  in  the  countryside  proved  to  be  a  kind  of
unemployment insurance for which the employers didn’t have to pay. Even more, it was a
chance for them to lower the wages, since the purchase power of the workers did not
have to include the price of these self-produced means of existence. As a result of the
very dense railway network (including many branch lines from 1885 onwards), the spatial
effect of this measure should not be underestimated (Van der Haegen, 1984). It forms the
basis for the relatively very large commuter zones around Belgium’s large cities (Brussels
in particular, where the size of the zone is almost comparable to that of London)8. 
8 The first housing legislation of 1889 followed the workers’ uprisings of 1886 (kept fairly
successfully  under  control  in  Flanders)  (Smets,  1977).  Here too,  the Catholics  used a
spatial strategy to fight out the class struggle. The law encouraged workers to acquire
property. In owning their own homes, they would empathise with the interests of the
propertied  class  and,  in  addition,  they  would  now  also  be  bound  to  pay  off  their
mortgage, which should make them think twice about going on strike. However, property
acquisition would also put family life in the spotlight and raise the individual interests of
every family above the collective interests of the workers. Finally, it would also draw
workers away from the urban working class areas – particularly the better paid and
better  educated  workers  who  should  be  able  to  play  a  leading  role  in  the  workers’
movement – and anchor them down in neighbourhoods on the edge of town, where they
could still afford land prices.
9 The garden suburb idea,  which would define  social  housing construction in  Belgium
following its inception in 1919,  must be seen within the context of this past,  even if
socialist players are the driving forces in this case. The garden suburbs have to be located
in the countryside, but closely connected to the city, so as to alleviate the evils of the city
and support the progress of industrialisation at the same time. Socialists adopted the idea
of taking the workers out of the city, since it was the most evident way to improve their
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living  conditions.  However, contrary  to  the  Catholics,  who  banned  every  collective
service from the garden cities, except the church and the catholic primary school, the
Socialists did see these services as a way to strengthen their movement (Mougenot, 1988).
Catholics, on the other hand, were to place further stress on the individual home and
continue  to  encourage  an  exodus  from  the  city,  with  the  most  significant  housing
measures since the formation of the Société Nationale des Habitations à Bon Marché –
Nationale Maatschappij voor Goedkope Woningen (National Social Housing Association)
(Goossens, 1983). First came the Moyersoens law in 1922, which provided a subsidy for the
acquisition of property, then the formation of the Housing Fund of the Ligue des Familles
Nombreuses – Bond der Kroostrijke Gezinnen (Union for Large Families) in 1928, which
provided cheap mortgages for large families, followed by the formation of the Société
Nationale  de  la  Petite  Propriété  Terrienne  –  Nationale  Maatschappij  voor  Kleine
Landeigen-dommen (National Society for Small  Landowners) in 1935,  whose intention
was to promote a return to the land for workers who found themselves out of work and to
give them an incentive to garden and cultivate on a small scale (it thus repeated resorting
to self-sufficiency as a cheap alternative to unemployment benefits in the new times of
crisis) and, finally, the building premium provided by the De Taeye law in 1948, which
fixed the present-day appearance of the Flemish residential landscape, with either strip
building along the roads or residential estates scattered in the countryside. The premium
helped individual households to become owner-occupiers by building their own house.
More than one-third of all post-war new housing construction was co-financed by the
premium and the  large  majority  of  it  took place  in  the  countryside,  because  of  the
cheaper  land  prices.  Fordist  economic  growth  and  suburbanisation,  the  spatial
embodiment of the consumer society upon which this growth is founded, took care of the
rest. Indeed, the increase of purchase power, full employment and the general spreading
of credit supported access to owner-occupation outside the cities. This new residential
environment  forced  the  households  to  enter  in  a  consumption  spiral  of  durable
consumption  goods,  chiefly  the  car  and  home  appliances.  The  resulting  continuous
expansion of the sales of these goods promoted economic growth.
10 The legendary brick in the Belgian stomach (by which is meant that the dream of every
Belgian is to build his own house) is therefore a chiefly Flemish (and Brussels) brick. It has
little to do with our attitude or genes, but was served up to the population over a 120-
year  period,  as  a  solution  to  social  struggle  in  the  context  of  unequal  regional
development  and  the  pillarisation  of  Belgian  society.  The  complete  lack  of  effective
spatial planning until the late 1970s provided the required space, while the Keynesian
zeal to create infrastructures, associated with the local politicians’ inclination to identify
a rising municipal population with increased welfare, provided the (expensive) conditions
for the emergence of a primarily Flemish housing estate mentality, which demotes the
city into a place of work. Even more, the economic expansion laws of 1959 and 1970 added
industrial  estates  to the housing ones.  Everywhere,  but  again more in Flanders than
Wallonia,  industrial  parks  were  created  to  promote  employment.  They  nurtured  the
claims for work in one’s own region and,  at  least  in the mentality of  the non-urban
population, nearly transformed the cities into redundant places. 
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The Christian political hegemony 
11 As is  evident  from the analysis  above,  the traditional  predominance of  Christians  in
Flanders – in contrast to the predominance of socialism along the Walloon industrial axis
– is  certainly the result  of  the industrial  revolution,  the Church and the bourgeoisie
having  the  time  to  take  those  measures  which  would  nip  socialism  in  the  bud
(Vandermotten e.a., 1990). 
12 Socialism and liberalism – which sprouted from the civil and industrial revolutions – only
made a breakthrough where the Christian strategy was not fulfilled or came too late
(figure  1).  The  regions  where  textile  or  small-scale  rural  industry  –  sugar  factories,
breweries,  distilleries  –  led to the emergence of  small  towns,  are usually bastions of
liberalism. These industries,  local and family-based in nature,  produced a bourgeoisie
who rose up against Catholic conservatism and which succeeded in bringing about local,
relatively sustainable hegemony. This is the case in the electoral cantons of Landen and
Tienen and in cities such as Ghent, Ronse, Oudenaarde, Lokeren and Ninove. However, in
all those places where industrialisation has eroded the traditional ideological structures,
socialism also makes its mark. More so than liberalism, it is an urban phenomenon: this
can be  seen in  Ostend,  Ghent  and particularly  along the  Antwerp-Brussels  axis.  The
Hageland and Haspengouw, between Leuven and Sint-Truiden, are the exceptions, where
“commuter socialism” is evident, upheld by the local working population which reports
on a daily or weekly basis to a more militant working environment in Brussels, Antwerp
or the mines of Liège and later also Limburg.
 
Figure 1. The Christian political hegemony in Flanders 1921-1985. 
13 Everywhere  else,  the  Christian  political  family  dominates.  Paradoxically,  even  the
Limburg mining basin remains chiefly Catholic. Through paternalistic measures and the
development  of  garden  suburbs  and  facilities,  the  mine  owners  built  up  social  and
ideological  control  over  the  workers,  founded  on  their  Catholic  background.  The
commuters from the Hageland escaped this tight territorial control and were therefore
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more militant (De Rijck e.a., 2000). The Flemish post-World War II CVP (Christian People’s
Party)  landscape is  therefore supported by sturdy geopolitical  structures which were
surprisingly reinforced by educational structures dating from before the First World War
and local political practice.
14 The  Catholic  hegemony  in  secondary  education,  dating  from  before  the  Belgian
independence,  could not be broken by state education in large part of both Flanders
provinces (west of the Antwerp-Brussels axis) and in the Antwerp and Limburg Campine
(north  east  of  the  Region)  and  these  areas  are  still  the  political  strongholds  of  the
Christian Party at the end of the 20th century.  Only a few shifts took place after the
Second World War. Aside from the power struggles between Socialists and Liberals in a
few cantons, the CVP only lost significant ground in Limburg, to the SP (Socialist Party)
(where the local leader was the future Nato General Secretary Willy Claes) and to the VU
(Volksunie – Flemish nationalist party) (their local leader took his electors with him when
he crossed over to the VLD (Liberal Party)). Fundamentally, these changes have to do with
the Fordist international investments in Limburg that destroyed the economic hegemony
of the mining world (Swyngedouw, 1990). The closure of the mines in the late 1980s and
early 1990s have reinforced this tendency. 
 
The shifts of the 1999 parliamentary elections
15 Although there have been more severe changes in terms of votes in earlier periods, the
federal and regional elections of 13 June 1999 brought about the most considerable spatial
shift in Flanders (Vandermotten e.a., 2001), both in terms of results and in the ensuing
coalition. The latest municipal election did confirm this shift. In order to measure its
extent, we compare the geography of the election results with the traditional geopolitical
fault lines in Flanders9. After all, these geopolitical structures expose undercurrents that
are decisive in the success and decline of the major political families. Not every place
within a region experiences the influence of these undercurrents with the same intensity,
but every local party stronghold or the dominant role of one party in a particular area
reminds us of the historical facts which have formed the Flemish political arena.
16 The  shift  is  first  documented  by  a  synoptical  analysis  of  the  votes  with  a  principal
correspondence  analysis.  This  multivariate  technique  can visualise  relationships  in  a
frequency  table.  More  specifically,  correspondence  analysis  can  visualise
interdependencies of rows and columns in a scatter plot. 
17 In this analysis, the rows represent the electoral cantons and the columns the political
parties. Each cell represents the number of votes for that party in the canton involved.
Thus, the rows show how the votes of one canton are allotted to the different parties. The
columns show the spatial distribution of the votes for one party. The correspondence
analysis leads to a visualisation of the relations between parties and cantons, by placing
both the rows and the columns on common planes. The centre of these planes represents
the average situation. In other words, a canton having the same distribution of votes as
the whole region, would be in the centre.  Similarly,  a party having exactly the same
percentage of votes in each canton, would be projected in the centre of the plane. The
more a party or a canton diverges from the equipartition situation, the further it will be
placed from the centre on the plane. Parties with a similar electoral geography will be
placed close together in the plane. Equally, electoral cantons with a similar distribution of
votes over the parties, will be close to each other. Finally, parties and cantons situated in
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the same direction from the centre are linked by a common overrepresentation (the
party collects relatively more votes in this canton and the canton votes relatively more
for that party than for the others). In order to avoid any misinterpretation, one also has
to verify if the concerned parties and cantons are well represented in the planes. Indeed,
it  is  impossible to represent all  the deviations in canton and party profiles from the
equipartition situation in one single bi-dimensional  plane.  The successive dimensions
embody the largest possible share of the total deviations (called inertia), but when only
two of them are selected to span a plane on which parties and cantons are projected,
some parties and cantons will be poorly represented. In that case it is impossible to say
anything significant about their position in that plane. The quality of this representation
can be measured for each element by means of the square cosines of the angles between
both axes and the vector defined by the position of the element in the multidimensional
space describing all the deviations. When the sum of both squared cosines is one, it means
that the vector lies perfectly on the visualised surface, and thus is entirely represented.
When the sum is zero, the vector lies perpendicular to the visualised surface, and nothing
can be said about the distance and direction of the element concerned. The closer this
value  to  one,  the  more  the  point  is  representative,  and  more  meaningful  the
interpretations extracted from it (Greenacre & Blasius, 1994).
18 When we look at the results, the total inertia can be described in six dimensions, or six
orthogonal  axes.  It  turns out  that  the first  three axes  already describe 83.5% of  the
deviations vis-à-vis to the expected row- and column profiles (table 1). If we only consider
these three axes, the VU-ID10 and Agalev (the Greens) are not very well represented. The
former has clearly its own electoral geography, related to the strongholds of some party
leaders. The latter has a weaker idiosyncratic pattern. A close examination of the data
reveals a strong positive deviation in the canton of Leuven, explained by the weight of the
university on the socio-economic structure of the population. However, the Greens are
equally well  represented by the first  two axes.  The three traditional  parties  and the
extreme right (Vlaams Blok) are well represented by the first three axes. Therefore, we
examine the results in two planes: the plane spanned by the first and the second axes and
the one spanned by the first and the third axes. 
 
Table 1. Principal correspondence analysis of the Parliamentary elections 1999: the squared
cosines of the parties for the different dimensions. 
19  
20 To distinguish  between urban and non-urban cantons,  and to  avoid  overloading  the
figures, we introduced a simple measure for urbanism. Population density seems to be the
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most logical criterion, though the differences in size of the electoral cantons can disturb
the picture. However, when an urban canton contains non-urban zones (or vice versa), a
part of the election results in this canton can be said to be non-urban. Therefore, we can
justify this approach. We chose a threshold of 500 inhabitants/km², and all the electoral
cantons that didn’t reach this threshold are indicated on the figures with “P”. This results
in 25 cantons being classified as urban11, which are identified by their names. Not every
canton is equally well represented in each of the visualised subspaces, but the major part
of them is well represented on the first three axes. 
21 Figure 2 visualises the first two dimensions. The first dimension clearly separates urban
(and industrial) cantons from non-urban cantons. The profile deviations of the urban
cantons correspond with the electoral geography of the Vlaams Blok, and, although they
are not very well  represented on the graph,  to a lesser extent Agalev and the small
parties.  The right upper quadrant also contains a few rich,  suburban cantons around
Antwerp: Kapellen, Kontich, and Duffel. The non-urban cantons in this area are also less
densely populated cantons in the Antwerp periphery. Thus, the upper part of the graph
illustrates the Vlaams Blok strongholds, which are mainly urban and suburban, and the
fact that the Greens are the only important party that confronts extreme right in the
same cantons.  In contrast,  the Christian Democrats are over-represented in the non-
urban areas, confirming the geopolitical positioning of the party. The urban cantons in
the south of the province of West-Flanders form a remarkable exception: Kortrijk, Menen,
Harelbeke, Izegem and Roeselare where endogenous economic development has taken
place,  protected from the influences of  Belgian high finance and,  subsequently,  from
foreign  investment.  This  development  is  borne  along by  Christian  ownership,  which
sprouted from the small and medium-sized enterprises that have their roots in former
flax cultivation. The region, which boasts of being the “Texas of Flanders”,  remained
faithful to its ideological roots.
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Figure 2. Principal correspondence analysis of the Parliamentary elections 1999: plot of parties and
electoral cantons on the first and the second axis. 
22 The second dimension contrasts the socialist-oriented cantons on the left side with the
other parties on the right (except the Liberals (VLD)12 not representative on this plane).
The previously mentioned traditional urban socialist bastions are all in the upper left
quadrant. The higher their score on the first dimension, the more they have been taken
over by the Vlaams Blok and Agalev. The Socialists’ position reveals they are not anymore
the urban party par excellence. Indeed, the first axis separates the urban areas from the
other, and not the second. After all, quite some non-urban cantons are situated in the
lower left quadrant of the figure. Only Ostend and Hasselt (Limburg) appear as socialist
urban strongholds, and both are related to the presence of strong electoral candidates.
23 The electoral geography of the Liberals is revealed by the third dimension (figure 3). The
vertical axis is again the first dimension, contrasting the urban and non-urban cantons. 
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Figure 3. Principal correspondence analysis of the Parliamentary elections 1999: plot of parties and
electoral cantons on the first and the third axis.
24 The VLD appears in the lower left quadrant, quite close to the graph centre (the positions
of SP, Agalev and VU-ID are not significant on this plane). Thus, compared to the others,
the Liberals are the closest to equipartition. Obviously, a large majority of the non-urban
cantons, small cities and suburban cantons (Destelbergen is the only suburban canton of
Ghent classified as urban) are those where the Liberals are over-represented. The upper
left quadrant displays the cantons where the VLD is challenged by the Vlaams Blok and/
or Agalev. In fact, all the suburban cantons around Antwerp are located in it. But on this
level, as is the case with the Socialists in Hasselt and Ostend, we should also consider the
role of candidates, more intensive campaigns and -connected with these factors- electoral
discourses restricted to this area.
25 In order to visualise the shifts over time, we made a similar analysis with the results of
the parliamentary elections of 1987, and calculated the positions of the parties in the 1999
elections on these planes. The structure of the squared cosines is less clear in 1987 (table
2).  In other words,  the particularities of  the electoral  geography of each party cover
several  independent  dimensions.  Nevertheless,  the  first  axis  expresses  the  same
geographical polarisation as in 1999, even if the Christian Democrats also have their own
dimension. The second part of the table shows how well the geographical electoral profile
of the parties fit into the 1987 situation. VU-ID, and to a lesser extent Agalev and the
others, experienced a rather important shift, since their inertia is not very well described
by the six dimensions of the 1987 results. However, more shifts are expressed by swaps
between dimensions.  Thus,  both  the  Christian  Democrats  and the  Liberals  lost  their
distinctive dimension and are best  represented by the first,  most  general  dimension.
Moreover,  the  much  lower  cosine  of  the  1999  results  of  the  Vlaams  Blok  on  this
dimension points to a less unique geographical profile.
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Table 2. Principal correspondence analysis of the Parliamentary elections 1987: the squared
cosines of the parties for the different dimensions and position of the parties in the 1999 elections.
26 The plot of the first and the fourth axes (figure 4) yields a more powerful illustration of
these shifts. The latter was chosen because it places the strong socialist-oriented cantons
on  the  left  of  the  figure  (and  partially  opposes  them to  the  strong  liberal-oriented
cantons).  This  has the advantage of  comparability with figure 2,  where the socialist-
oriented cantons were also positioned on the left side of the figure. Since the added share
of the total inertia of both dimensions only slightly exceeds the 50%, interpretation must
be given with caution. Moreover, Agalev, VU and the others are ignored because their
deviations are not well reflected in this plane. 
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Figure 4. Principal correspondence analysis of the Parliamentary elections 1987: plot of parties and
electoral cantons on the first and the fourth axis and position of the parties in the 1999 elections.
27 Compared to the 1999 elections, the dichotomy between urban and non-urban cantons is
weaker.  Most  non-urban  cantons  are  still  in  the  lower  half  of  the  graph,  but  only
Antwerp, its suburbs and Mechelen are on the positive side. This position is obviously
related with a strong overrepresentation of extreme right votes. The expansion of the
Vlaams Blok outside its Antwerp bastion started on the first “Black Sunday” in 1991.
Furthermore, the non-urban cantons are more concentrated in the lower right quadrant,
related to Christian Democrat and/or Liberal over-representation. The Socialists appear
as a much more urban party than in 1999. 
28 The shifts between 1987 and 1999 are indicated by arrows. Although the positions are not
perfectly represented, three types of changes are observed. Clearly, the CVP and the SP
move away from the centre, indicating they diverge more than in 1987 from an equal
strength in all  cantons.  The Liberals  are  moving towards the former position of  the
Christian Democrats. In other words, they gradually take over the positions held by the
CVP. The transfer to liberalism undoubtedly reflects the conscientious centrism of the
large political families. They are all fishing for the votes of the same middle classes (that
became as a matter of fact the largest social group in society) and therefore abandoning
all defence of the ideology and social model which formed the basis for their movement,
referring to the classical socio-political fault lines in our society (Vanlaer, 1984). This shift
to the centre is related to what Galbraith terms the “politics of contentment” (Taylor,
2000). For the majority of the voters, good life continues after the crisis, and they don’t
need any more a part of the State’s social facilities, which were a component of the social-
democratic  consensus.  Understanding  this,  the  political  parties  became  pure
representation parties. They abandoned to a considerable extent their original ideology
and all lean on the same (neo-liberal) project. All traditional parties propagate these “new
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politics” of globalisation. Precisely these “new politics” and their effects, which are most
striking in the cities, are questioned by Agalev and the Vlaams Blok. 
29 In  addition,  the  assignment  of  election  campaigns  to  the  media  and  to  marketing
consultancies has meant that the political messages of the large parties have become
highly homogenised. The switch from one political family to another is therefore very
difficult to interpret as a political U-turn. It is much more a reflection of the request to
change teams (the promised “change”) in order to continue pursuing more or less the
same policy.
30 Finally, and most obvious, the Vlaams Blok displays the most important shift towards the
centre,  reflecting  its  growing  success  across  the  whole  of  Flanders.  The  progress  of
extreme-right has been larger in the periphery than in the urban areas since 1991 (figure
5). In addition, the absolute growth in percentage has been greater in the periphery than
in the urban areas since 1995 (De Maesschalck, 2000). 
Figure 5. The ratio between the percentage of votes for the Vlaams Blok in 1995 and 1991.
31 This expansion of the Vlaams Blok from Antwerp is organised along three lines, each
embodying a precise form of racism (Kesteloot & De Decker,  1992).  Firstly,  the party
targets  the  (relatively  scarce)  voters  in  deprived  areas,  who  are  usually  shrouded  in
insecurity  themselves,  by picking out  the “migrants”13 as  being responsible  for  their
situation (despair racism). Therefore, the Blok focuses on the working class areas of the
large cities and the smaller industrial cities, where immigrants share the neighbourhoods
with the Belgian working class, victim of deindustrialisation, the economic crisis and loss
of social networks. Clearly, they capture socialist votes in this area. The Blok also looks
for voters among the middle classes by creating for them the illusion that it has a solution
to the “migrant problem” which will not threaten either the position or the peace of
mind of the middle classes (distancing racism – even if one is not directly confronted with
the presence of immigrants, the racist views of the Vlaams Blok are approved, since they
promise the use of the city without being troubled by the differences, the inequalities and
insecurity generated by the urban social injustice). CVP and even more VLD are losing in
this case (Swyngedouw & Beerten, 1999). Finally, the two themes are linked together in
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pure electoral racism, which strengthens the two previous types, even in places where
such racism has no focus (perfectly translated by the slogans “Eigen volk eerst” – Own
people first – and “Baas in eigen land” – Boss in one’s own country.
32 The multivariate analysis of the electoral data reveals three main changes compared to
Flanders’ traditional geopolitical structure: a loss of power of the Christian Democrats,
mainly in favour of the Liberals; a change in the geographical specificity of the Socialists:
they lose ground in the cities and maintain only a few strongholds where individual
candidates make the difference; a dramatic expansion of the Vlaams Blok over the whole
Flemish Region (not to mention their attempt to conquer the majority among the Flemish
minority in Brussels). An analysis of the electoral maps of the 1999 elections sheds more
light on these shifts and reveals more complex relations between the parties and anti-
urbanism.
33 A  look  at  the  spatial  pattern  of  the  dominant  parties  in  each  canton  confirms  the
substitution of the Liberals for the Christian Democrats (figure 6). The CVP only holds its
ground in the Antwerp Campine, North Limburg, West Flanders and the Meetjesland (the
northwest of East Flanders). These areas correspond fairly well to the areas where the
education hegemony of the Catholics was maintained through the 19th century (figure 1).
Nevertheless, these are economically speaking peripheral regions with low population
densities. In the central area, that some are keen to refer to as the “Flemish Diamond”
(the Antwerp-Ghent-Brussels-Leuven quadrangle), the CVP only offers resistance in those
cantons which are the least influenced by regional economic development, specifically
the  north  of  the  Waasland  and  the  Pajottenland,  south-west  of  Brussels.  The  only
noteworthy exception to this  marginalisation of  the CVP is  the area around Kortrijk
already described in the correspondence analysis.
 
Figure 6. The political map of 1999 (Parliament elections).
34 The VLD has become the dominant party in the vast majority of the other cantons. No
historical  structures  can be  found which indicate  any predestination for  that  area  –
forming a wide swathe from Ghent to South Limburg – to switch from catholicism to
liberalism. This is, however, the zone with the highest population density, with the most
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intense development of Flemish prosperity. This is expressed in the dominant residential
form, housing estates that are neither rural nor urban and village places that have been
transformed into financial centres where every large bank has a branch. Surprisingly
enough, this way of life and this landscape are much more likely to have been created by
the aforementioned Christian politics than by liberal progressive thinking.
35 From this point of view, the crumbling of the Christian Democrats does not represent the
major shift in Flemish geopolitics. By contrast, the collapse of the Socialists is much more
spectacular. Urban socialism has lost all its allure. The red zone from Antwerp to Brussels
has turned brown. Ghent fell  into the hands of the Liberals and has also witnessed a
worrying surge of the extreme right Vlaams Blok. Except where they have held on thanks
to accidental personal success (Ostend and Limburg), the socialist cantons are no longer
the most industrialised nor the most urban (with the exception of the small  town of
Wervik in south West-Flanders) (figure 7).  On the contrary, in 1999 the geography of
socialism in Flanders looks very much like that of the CVP: between them, they share the
remainder of the periphery in West Flanders and Limburg.
 
Figure 7. The votes for the SP (Socialists) in 1999 Parliament elections.
36 Today, the old socialist and liberal bridgeheads are controlled by the Vlaams Blok and
Agalev (Figures 8 and 9). The Vlaams Blok regularly collects over 20 percent of the votes
from Antwerp to Mechelen.  In Ghent and along this axis,  it  obtains over 15 percent,
benefiting from the tensions surrounding the presence of immigrant workers in Lokeren
(a small  textile  town between Antwerp and Ghent),  Beringen (a former coal  mine in
Limburg) and also in Ronse (another textile town along the southwest border; Moroccans
from Brussels have settled in Ronse relatively recently in an effort to accelerate their
integration and social promotion by moving out of concentration zones).
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Figure 8. The votes for the Vlaams Blok (extreme right) in 1999 Parliament elections.
 
Figure 9. The votes for Agalev (the Greens) in 1999 Parliament elections.
37 Nowhere in Flanders is Agalev the dominant party, but it has strongholds in the entire
province of Antwerp and in the cities of Ghent and Leuven from where the Greens – in
spite of the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp – are expanding their electoral base.
38 Although the largest relative increases of the extreme right votes are in the peripheral
cantons, the Vlaams Blok appears to have an expansion strategy that follows the urban
hierarchy and then spreads over the concerned suburbs. However, the Vlaams Blok is not
an urban party. It in no way defends the interests of the cities and their inhabitants, who
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have  suffered  in  recent  decades  from  the  consequences  of  the  economic  crisis  and
globalisation. The Vlaams Blok uses racism and repression – under the guise of security –
to  tackle  social  exclusion  in  deprived  districts,  the  problems  associated  with
unemployment, poor housing and the lack of socialisation of young people. In this way,
the problems are apparently ironed out by eliminating their victims from the towns and
cities. 
39 This  argument  makes  the  Vlaams  Blok  a  Trojan  horse  in  Flemish  cities.  After  all,
immigration, diversity and all the social and cultural input a city can attract, are regarded
as a problem to which purification and homogenisation are the solutions. In th long term,
such a view implies the destruction of urbanism. After all, towns and cities do only exist
as a result of constant rejuvenation and diversity. They only have a future if they can
continue to sustain themselves through immigration (see further). 
40 On the other hand, the spatial analysis of the election results pushes the Flemish Greens
to the fore as worthy successors to the previous century’s Liberals and Socialists, who
were incidentally together regarded as the political left until the inter-war period. The
VLD has  replaced the  CVP as  representative  of  the  large  Flemish  anti-urban middle
classes. For their part and no doubt because they exaggerated the centrism aspect, the
Socialists also lost their links with the cities. But Agalev still has to realise – and make it
clear to its electoral public – that it is the party that can pick up the threads of the long
history of emancipation and progress taking place in the urban arena. The Socialist party
is the only one that could join the Greens in this project, as far as it succeeds to recover
its former electoral position.
41 The municipal elections of October 2000 have further underlined that the city turns to be
the  new political  question in  Flanders.  Both the  regressive  effects  of  the  anti-urban
mentality and the danger of leaving the cities and their social problems to the Vlaams
Blok are at stake. The Vlaams Blok has strengthened its position in the Flemish cities,
even in Antwerp where it now reaches one third of the votes. Most political analysts were
surprised by the strong results of extreme right in the Antwerp suburbs. It reveals that
the process of distancing racism is not yet understood. This electoral choice reflects the
preference for a repressive city rather than urban solidarity: in order to continue to use
the inner city amenities in total safety these voters prefer a stronger police and a more
stringent judicial apparatus against the urban youth, rather than a social and economic
policy that attacks the roots of the urban malaise. As a matter of fact, the police in the
inner city is chiefly paid by its poor inhabitants, while the alternative policy is necessarily
financed at the federal or regional level... The (fragile) revival of the SP was more of a
surprise and it could play a role in the setting up of a possible urban alliance against the
extreme right danger. In order to regain power, the party plans a large-scale renewal
project. For such a relining, one can make a double distinction, between social strategy on
the one hand and political strategy on the other (Johnston, 1990). Concerning the first,
the Socialists can try to regain the traditional workers’ support, or try to extend their
electorate to other classes. The SP chooses clearly for the second option, also because the
workers and the small employees form a too small electoral basis. Concerning the second,
the  party  has  to  choose between  either  the  traditional  issues,  or  a  new  political
programme (like Labour invented “the Third Way” in Great Britain). It is hard to imagine
a workable combination in this double choice, that would avoid the party remaining in
the centre of the political spectrum, where it runs a great risk to loose electorate both to
the left and the right. In contrast, the results of the Greens was disappointing, certainly if
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compared  with  the  success  of  Ecolo  (the  French  speaking  Greens)  in  Brussels  and
Wallonia. Even if this is not the reason of their weakness, the Greens didn’t play the card
of urbanism to buttress their geopolitical position in Flanders. 
 
Urbanism as a way of hope
42 In Marxist urban geography and sociology, the city is regarded as a spatial concentration
of social surplus (Harvey, 1973). For Louis Wirth a city is defined by size, density and
heterogeneity (1938). Although Wirth developed a largely negative image of the city when
exploring  urban  behaviour  on  the  basis  of  these  features,  their  combination  with
Harvey’s concentration process yields a relevant and much more positive insight in the
nature of  urbanism.  The density of  Wirth’s  definition refers to concentration;  size is
achieved by accumulation of  wealth;  heterogeneity results  from the fact that  wealth
exonerates  urban  dwellers  from  direct  self-sufficient  production.  As  a  result,  cities
concentrate  many  people  who can  think,  create,  dream,  write,  innovate,  manage  or
decide.  All  this  works much better  because they are not  sitting in ivory towers,  but
clustered  together  in  a  place  where  information  and  channels  of  communication
converge. 
43 This very basic description of the nature of urbanism reveals the social consequences of
anti-urbanism and what  is  at  stake  with  the  political  expansion of  extreme-right  in
Flanders. Bluntly speaking, anti-urbanism has generated a Flemish intellectual poverty.
The problem could be traced to the counter-reformation,  which chased the brightest
minds from our cities away to the north. The socio-linguistic frontier has prevented the
development of standardised Dutch and linked the language with all its local variations to
the peasant and later working class status. The bourgeoisie, however, adopted French and
any social promotion was associated with a shift to the French language, even after the
Second World War.  As a result,  the Flemish intellectual potential  – which did indeed
flourish in the cities – was deeply embedded in French culture. 
44 Since then, anyone who had the opportunity to form part of a Flemish intellectual class
was  all-too-often  crippled  by  the  partitioned  character  of  his  non-urban  residential
environment (Laermans, 1993). One hundred and twenty years of obsession precisely with
spreading the emancipating layers of the population outside the cities have established a
partitioning  of  communication,  information  and  social  relationships,  which  leads  to
something  like  a  “Readers’  Digest  intellectualism”,  uniform,  ready-made  and  rigid,
preventing  all  questioning  of  a  paternalistic  common  sense.  Scattered  in  their
“fermettes”  (pseudo  small  farmhouses)(14),  the  Flemish  middle  classes  never  turned
towards the cities to satisfy their curiosity and creativity. 
45 The hope for more emancipating power and a brighter intellectual future of Flanders is
related  to  the  recent  economic  and  socio-cultural  history  of  the  Region.  A  sound
intellectual class in Flanders is only now emerging. While in the 60s and 70s, broadly
speaking 20 to 30% of the university students would have parents with some form of
higher  education,  they  are  the  majority  today.  Meanwhile,  both  the  numbers  of
university students and of university degree holders were multiplied by five between
1960 and 199115.  These young (potential) intellectuals need the cities in order to fulfil
their  aspirations  and  some  welcome,  but  tentative  signs  of  change  are  evident.  For
instance,  Leuven student associations are increasingly organising outings to Brussels,
while some choose to stay on in Brussels after their studies, rather than in Leuven. The
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idea of giving Brussels’ students more of a base in the city is under consideration and a
consortium of  universities  and high schools  is  creating a type of  “Quartier  Latin” in
Brussels. Proportionally speaking, foreigners are also choosing Brussels in preference to
the suburban areas of Brabant; these most probably include the second generation of the
first EU civil servants who settled in the suburbs of Brussels in the 60s and 70s, as well as
the younger newcomers arriving to swell the ranks of Eurocrats following expansion of
the Union and of its powers, or to take up the generated employment in other sectors
(Kesteloot e.a., 2000).
46 The geographical  dispersal  of  wealth implied by anti-urban politics  also explains the
relatively high concentration of poverty in cities, particularly in the 19th century belt,
which has carried the slur of intimidation since its inception (“insecurity” in current
terms). The urban immigrant workers (i.e. the large majority of them if one excludes the
Limburg mining area) originally filled in the economic and spatial gaps created by the
upward social mobility of the Flemings. Indeed, the expansion of the Flemish middle class
and its transfer to the non-urban areas explain the concentration of immigrants in the
low-paid and low-skilled positions of the urban labour market and in the abandoned
inner city working class neighbourhoods. Such a socio-spatial contrast between the inner
cities and large suburban areas is dramatic when the financial resources of the cities are
mainly determined by local incomes (De Brabander e.a.,  1987). Indeed, the population
that benefits from the city because it finds its employment there and uses the urban
amenities,  pays  its  local  taxes  in  the  suburban municipalities.  Meanwhile,  the  urban
municipalities, which finance the collective goods and services for these city users, face a
decline of their fiscal basis through the decrease of their own population. Continuous
deindustrialisation since the sixties, the economic crisis of the seventies and eighties and
the socio-spatial polarisation of the nineties have driven the former urban working class
into poverty and desperation. In such circumstances, this residual voting population of
the inner cities is easily dazzled by the Vlaams Blok scapegoat and security discourses,
without understanding its anti-urban character. The same socio-spatial process equally
underpins the distancing stances on which the Vlaams Blok builds its electoral successes
in the suburbs (Kesteloot & De Decker, 1992). The study of the socio-spatial structure of
Flanders and its geopolitical change suggests that the rise of extreme-right outside the
inner  city  neighbourhoods  is  not  just  the  result  of  erratic  behaviour  of  part  of  the
electorate,  nor of  a  particularly strong persuasion ability of  the Vlaams Blok.  It  is  a
symptom of the interdependent fears of the city and of difference, deeply rooted in the
Flemish  middle  class.  The  economic  crisis  caused  a  surge  of  social  exclusion  that
materialised in a double otherness in the Flemish mentality: that of the city and of the
immigrant. The Vlaams Blok precisely takes advantage of the mutual reinforcement of
the fear of the city and the fear of the immigrant. However, few political critics came to
the insight that the struggle against extreme-right does not only require resistance to
racism (and its close parent sexism), but also the struggle for the city and for urbanism in
a profound anti-urban Flanders Region. This is also the only solution for the scapegoat
stances that develop in the inner city neighbourhoods.
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NOTES
1. Some explanation is needed about the federal arrangement of the Belgian State in order to
understand the relations between Flanders and Brussels. Belgium consists of 3 territorial regions:
the Flemish,  the Walloon and the Brussels Capital  Region,  each with its  own government.  In
addition, there are the French and the Flemish Community that overlap in the Brussels Capital
Region (and a small German-speaking community in the Walloon Region). The Flemish Regional
Government and the Flemish Community Government are merged.
2. Brussels  has  950.000  inhabitants  and  35%  of  them  live  in  deprived  areas.  In  comparison
Antwerp has 450.000 inhabitants,  of  whom 21% in deprived areas.  In Ghent they are 16% of
225.000 inhabitants. However, one could advocate that the Social Impulse Fund only concerns the
Flemish Community in Brussels. Although there is no language census, between 15 and 20% of the
Brussels population can be considered as Flemish. 
3. The Vlaams Blok is an extreme-right Flemish nationalist party. The Brussels Capital Region
Government is based on a double majority in the French and the Flemish communities of the
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Region. With a majority in the Flemish community, the party could block the Brussels Region and
jeopardize the whole Belgian federal construction. Recently, one of their MP’s proposed to block
all communications from and to Brussels and to economically asphyxiate the city in order to
force it to join the future Flemish State (geographically, Brussels is an enclave in the Flemish
Region).
4. Interestingly, the Walloons have developed a parallel aversion to Brussels because Walloon
industry  was  controlled  by  Brussels  bankers  and  shareholders.  For  them,  Brussels  bears
responsibility for the downturn in the Walloon economy. 
5. In literature, anti-urbanism is mostly associated with the United States that built its nation-
state on westward rural colonisation, rather than on industrialisation and urbanisation. In the
present context, it refers to the general aversion of the large city, which is more in line with the
critique of the industrial city. But the latter is not necessarily anti-urban (Choay, 1965). 
6. There are a few exceptions, largely restricted to cities in the province of East-Flanders. Ghent
is by large the most important. The trade unions and other workers’ movement institutions first
originated in Ghent, but they never reached a political influence like in Wallonia.
7. These dangers were at the origin of Haussmannisation projects in most of the large Belgian
cities in the last quarter of the 19th century. While the sanitation effect was significant, these
projects aimed at bringing the bourgeoisie back to the city (with poor success),  and the side
effect was that a part of the working class was further driven out (others were concentrated in
the remaining urban working class areas, see Franken 1988 for the Brussels case). 
8. In terms of population, Amsterdam is one-quarter smaller than Brussels but the commuter
zone is barely 1000 km², compared to 4400 km² for Brussels. The ratio between the total area of
the functional urban system and the population of the urban agglomeration is 0,53 ha per urban
inhabitant, compared to 0,33 for Frankfurt, 0,22 for Paris and less than 0,2 for Lille, London and
the  Ruhr.  For  Randstad  Holland  the  ratio  is  0,11  ha  per  urban  inhabitant  (calculated  from
Vandermotten e.a. 1999). 
9. A detailed description of these structures can be found in De Smet & Evalenko (1956), see also
Vandermotten e.a. (2001).
10. Before the last elections, the VU made an alliance with a new party (ID21) advocating ‘social
liberalism’.
11. The electoral canton of Genk, the centre of the Limburg mining region, falls just into the
‘urban region’.
12. The  acronym  of  the  Liberals  changed  from  PVV  to  VLD  between  the  two  elections
(interestingly from Party for Freedom and Progress to Flemish Liberal Democrats).
13. This term is the most accepted to name the population stemming from the labour migrations
from the 60s and 70s. It implies that they are still on the move and not definitely settled. Even
the second and third generation are called migrants,  although they didn’t  participate to any
migratory movement. The Vlaams Blok has preferred for a long time the term ‘guestworkers’,
denoting their opinion that they are invited persons who should go back home as soon as the
purpose of their visit has been exhausted.
14. This is literally the Dutch term for the most frequent architectural style in the dispersed
residential estates. It loosely refers to the small isolated farms of the Flemish rural core area, as if
fear of the city had to materialise in a false espousal of a vanished, but mythical rurality (the
psychoanalysis of the ‘fermette’ style is still to be carried out).
15. At the Catholic University of Leuven, the largest one in Flanders, 26% of the students had
parents with high education in 1964 against 61% in 1995. Combined with the overall increase of
the  student  population,  this  group  experienced  a  sixfold  increase,  with  more  than  15.000
students in 1995. Moreover, there was a huge majority of male students in 1964 against a fair
gender balance in since the 90s. (Smedts, 1998).
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ABSTRACTS
Class  struggle  resulted  in  a  anti-urban  feeling  in  Flanders.  The  industrial  revolution  first
developed in Wallonia and industrialisation came much later in Flanders. The bourgeoisie and
the  Church  could  anticipate  rising  secularisation  and  socialism  in  Flanders  by  keeping  the
workers away from the cities through specific housing and mobility policies. This explains the
traditional Christian political hegemony in Flanders, with socialist and liberal cracks mainly in
the cities. In the second part of the paper the geography of the last parliamentary elections is
considered. In the light of anti-urbanism, the elections produced important spatial shifts. The
Christian party is replaced by the Liberals in the core of Flanders. In the cities, the Socialists are
in  decline,  in  favour  of  the  greens  and the  extreme-right,  the  latter  being  also  increasingly
successful in the suburban fringe and the non-urban areas. In the last part, it is argued that the
regressive cultural effects of anti-urbanism, but also the struggle against extreme-right, impose
that urban policies should be put higher on the Flemish political agenda. 
La  lutte  des  classes  a  produit  un  sentiment  anti-urbain  profond  en  Flandre.  La  révolution
industrielle  s’est  d’abord  manifestée  en  Wallonie  et  l’industrialisation  de  la  Flandre  est  plus
tardive. La bourgeoisie et l’Église ont pu anticiper la montée de la sécularisation et du socialisme
en maintenant les ouvriers hors des villes par les politiques du logement et de la mobilité. Cela
explique  l’hégémonie  politique  traditionnelle  des  Chrétiens  en  Flandre  avec  quelques  failles
socialistes  ou  libérales,  surtout  dans  les  villes.  La  seconde  partie  de  l’article  considère  la
géographie  des  dernières  élections  parlementaires. A  la  lumière  de  l’anti-urbanisme,  ces
élections présentent des changements spatiaux importants. Au cœur de la Flandre, les libéraux
ont  remplacé  les  chrétiens.  Dans  les  villes  les  socialistes  perdent  en  faveur  des  verts  et  de
l’extrême-droite  qui  gagne  aussi  dans  les  franges  urbaines  et  les  zones  non-urbaines.  En
conclusion, tant les effets culturels régressifs de l’anti-urbanisme que la lutte contre l’extrême-
droite imposent une plus grande priorité pour les politiques urbaines en Flandre. 
INDEX
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